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BLACK ADDER DISRUPTORS
By Andy Smith [ University of Genoa ] and William Bagley [ JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY ]
This article reports on an empirical re-search and development project con-ducted in collaboration by researchers 
at University of Genoa, Italy, and Johns 
Hopkins University, United States. It is a 
progress report summarizing one element of 
a broader effort that is intended to provide 
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) opera-
tors with reliable, open-source information 
to assist in the development of low-order mu-
nitions disruptors. Providing operators the 
information necessary to make energetic tools 
not only reduces cost but can also circumvent 
the restrictions and delays that often compli-
cate the import of disruptor components.
MUNITION DISRUPTORS
The disruptors described here use an ex-
plosively formed penetrator (EFP) to breach 
a munitions’ casing and initiate a burn of the 
high-explosive fill. The burn may consume the 
entire explosive content but more often leads 
to a deflagration, a partial detonation, or a full 
detonation. It is accepted that there is always a 
risk of high order detonation of the target mu-
nition so these disruptors are only used when 
a full detonation would be an acceptable, if 
undesirable, outcome.
The penetrator is formed by the detona-
tion of an explosive charge inside the disrup-
tor body in contact with a specifically shaped 
liner. This has the effect of focusing increased 
energy toward the target upon detonation, as 
first noted by Munroe in 1888. This phenom-
enon was extensively studied and exploit-
ed for use in the design of weapon systems 
and in explosive tunneling procedures. It 
was found, for example, that the geometry of 
the liner shape is critical for armor penetra-
tion and that adding other elements such as 
wave shapers inside the charge can further 
increase the concentration of the detonation 
forces. Complex liner designs are not believed 
to be necessary for munitions disruption pur-
poses for which the liner is generally a sim-
ple, shallow cap of metal. On detonation of 
the disruptor, the liner collapses inward and 
is projected under immense pressure toward 
the target. Upon penetration of the target, the 
energy released should start a fire in the high-
explosive (HE) content. If it burns too fast, 
the explosive will detonate. If it burns too 
slowly, the fire will be extinguished and the 
munition left hazardous.
The Black Adder disruptor.







Figure 1. EFP Disruptor components.
The Research and Development section is
 sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense
Unexploded Ordnance Center of Excellence
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A commonly used munition disruptor liner is a shallow cap of pressed 
copper, commonly called the Baldric. Alternatives that are intended to 
increase the probability of low-order neutralization success use pressed-
sheet magnesium in place of copper.
To provide controls by which to measure success, we used simple 
liners of copper and magnesium. Without the time or resources to ap-
proach this with the disciplined theoretical rigor that may have been 
ideal, we then used an informed but informal approach to design new 
disruptor liners that would be low-cost, easy to make, and more reliable 
than those commonly used. Strictly controlling variables in empirical 
testing allowed rapid progress to be made. 
CONTROLLING VARIABLES
It is known that disruptor reliability can be affected by the presence 
of air voids in the HE used to fill the disruptor in the field. It can also 
be affected by the distance between the disruptor and the target, and by 
the positioning of the detonator in relation to the liner. To control these 
variables during testing, we designed the simple disruptor body shown 
(see Figure 2).
This Black Adder body design is expensive when compared to using 
an off-cut of plumping pipe and wire. It was designed to control vari-
ables in liner testing rather than provide a disruptor body that is cheap 
to make in the field. It was our intent to control other variables as strict-
ly as practicable so that the only variable that could alter the outcome 
would be the new design of liner we made.
All liners were designed to penetrate at least 10 mm of steel and de-
liver a payload that encourages the HE to burn. Some liner designs were 
highly speculative as we experimented with geometry, shaping materi-
als, and fire-inducing payloads in a way that was intended to provide an 
indication of which liner would be worth continued testing.
EMPIRICAL TESTING: DAY ONE
The use of a clear, acrylic body was novel. To discover whether its fail-
ure to confine the detonation in the same manner as a steel body would 
cause problems, we carried out our first series of eight disruptor blast 
tests against inert targets. 
The tests included a control to allow comparison between a standard, 
steel-cased Baldric disruptor and the acrylic-bodied Black Adder dis-
ruptor. Both had simple, copper-cap liners, the same stand-off and the 
same HE charge. The Black Adder liner penetrated the target to a great-
er depth and with a larger, cleaner hole than the control. It was also 
observed, as an incidental benefit, that the Black Adder body burned 
up without fragmentation, which made it less hazardous in use than a 
steel body.
We went on to try several liner designs but, with no reliable way of re-
cording the spread of the liner material inside the inert target, we were 
not able to learn enough to make any informed comparison between the 
various liner behavior after entry.
EMPIRICAL TESTING: DAY TWO
Day two involved testing two control and eight unproven liner designs 
against inert targets. A witness piece that would provide a useful compar-
ison of liner designs without using live munitions was devised and placed 
inside a length of 5 mm steel box section with a 5 mm steel plate on top. 
This arrangement required the new liner to penetrate 10 mm of steel be-
fore entering the witness piece, which then provided a useful record of the 
intensity and spread of burning material inside the target.
In two series of five disruptor blasts, the effects of eight unproven lin-
ers and two controls were recorded. The HE available to charge the dis-
ruptors had a lower velocity of detonation than in the original test, but 
the results in the series would still be valid for comparison because the 
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charge was uniform within that test series. 
Analysis of the results allowed two of the ex-
perimental liner designs to be discarded and 
the remaining six to be ranked in order of 
what was believed to be their potential to pro-
duce the desired effect.
EMPIRICAL TESTING: DAY THREE
On day three, tests of the remaining experi-
mental liners against live munitions was con-
ducted. Generally, there is a greater chance of 
causing a detonation with small munitions 
because the point of attack with the disruptor 
will always be close to the fuze. Test articles 
Disruptor being used against an inert target.
Witness piece.
Setup showing five Black Adders prepared to fire.
The witness pieces provided a valuable, permanent record of the impact and the spread of material in-
side the targets.
for this series were 82 mm HE mortars that 
had been recently manufactured. Being facto-
ry fresh was a detail that we hoped would en-
sure consistency among targets. 
In each test, the feet of the Black Adder dis-
ruptor were taped in the same position on the 
target, and care was taken to ensure that the 
standoff, charge weight, and depth of detona-
tor insertion were identical. 
The copper control liner was used twice 
and, in both cases, the projectile penetrated 
both sides of the mortar casing without caus-
ing a burn or a detonation. This showed too 
much penetration and was an unsatisfactory 
result; the mortars were later destroyed using 
explosive donor charges.
The magnesium control liner was used 
twice and produced different results. In one 
instance, the mortar burned out and was 
thrown more than 100 meters away. In the 
other, the munition deflagrated. Both results 
were good, and the result provides evidence 
in support of the claim that a pressed mag-
nesium cap has advantages. But the results 
showed inconsistency.
Four different Black Adder liner designs 
were then tested (two liner designs remain 
untested due to lack of range time). When a 
liner performed well, the test was repeated to 
ensure that the result had a good chance of 
3
Smith and Bagley: Black Adder Disruptors
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2017
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT @ THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION 64
82 mm HE mortar bombs. A charged Black Adder ready to fire.
Burned out mortar shell (left) and deflagrated munition (right).
New liner one: mortar left in a hazardous condition.
New liner two: deflagrated mortar (left) and burned out mortar shell (right).
New liner three: in both mortars, the HE burned to deflagration.
An improvised and low-cost disruptor body with 
all of the variable control features of those used 
in our tests.
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being replicated. If a liner did not demonstrate the desired low-order 
disruption, it was not selected for additional tests.
 
NEW LINER ONE
In the first test using one of our experimental designs of liner, the 
munition was penetrated and some of the explosive filling had burned; 
there was no deflagration and the fuze was left in place. As this was an 
unsatisfactory result, the liner was set aside.
NEW LINER TWO
In the first test with liner two, the HE burned and increased pres-
sure inside the mortar and blew off the fuze, leaving some unburned 
explosive loose inside an intact casing. In the second test with this 
liner, the munition def lagrated. This was a result very similar to that 
achieved with the magnesium control liner. Both results were good, 
but inconsistent.
NEW LINER THREE
In both tests with liner three, the mortar deflagrated cleanly and a 
small amount of unburned HE was expelled. This was almost the best 
result possible and showed consistency.
NEW LINER FOUR
In both tests with liner four, the mortar completely burned out with 
no deflagration. This was the best possible result and showed consisten-
cy; it was also where we ran out of time.
DISCUSSION
The test results demonstrate that using a disruptor liner to deliver 
a payload that encourages the explosive content to burn can have ad-
vantages in terms of effectiveness and consistency when compared with 
simple, metal cap-liners. Results suggest which liners performed best, 
but the test set was small and the limited number of tests meant that the 
liners included payload and architecture variables that need to be ex-
plored further. For example, the geometry of liner four is complex and 
may not need to be if it was actually the unique payload that achieved the 
desired low-order effects. 
Referring back to our goals, the experimental liner materials selec-
tion criteria required that they be low-cost and not subject to shipping 
controls. The liners and payload ingredients could be imported without 
restriction or self-manufactured in any area of need. Some liner archi-
tecture is complex, and it is highly probable that similar results can be 
achieved with liner designs that would be much easier to make. After 
one or more proven liners have been selected for further development, 
the improvisation of disruptor bodies using large medical syringes or 
similarly locally-sourced material will be explored.
These results are encouraging and provide a limited set of results 
from which to refine the designs for further empirical testing. Only after 
repeated trials with consistent results will similar tests prove anything 
compelling about any individual liner shape or payload. This work will 
New liner four: an ideal result with all HE burned and no fragmentation.
continue as support permits, and we hope that a conclusion of value to 
field operatives can be published soon.  
See endnotes page 67
We owe a debt of gratitude to Ben Remfrey, Phil Jowett, and the staff 
of the EOD and Demining School at MAT Kosovo who coordinated ac-
cess to demolition consumables and test range support.1 The MAT Kosovo 
staff were able to arrange and oversee blast testing with a professional 
flexibility and patience that was greatly appreciated. We recommend the 
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mine action. 
Thanks also to the management and staff of the POLIEX factory and 
range in Berane, Montenegro.2 The authors also wish to acknowledge var-
ied useful inputs and advice from Cris Chellingsworth, United Kingdom.
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